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ILLUMINATING THE DARK CORNERS: THE NEW
MEXICO INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT’S LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCEPTION
Nicholas T. Davis ∗

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman. 1
Following an officer-involved shooting that results in a death, family
members will often want to consult a lawyer about what happened. To answer
questions from a prospective client and carry out his or her professional obligation,
a lawyer needs information, and often it requires more information than the potential
client has been given by the law enforcement agency involved. In order to meet those
ethical obligations and comply with the rules of civil procedure, i.e., to not bring
frivolous claims, the lawyer will rely on New Mexico’s sunshine statute, the
Inspection of Public Records Act, to request those public records that the lawyer
believes contain the valuable and necessary information. The lawyer’s requests will
often include records from the shooting itself, as well as events leading up to it, and
seek audio and video recordings, witness statements, and all reports by law
enforcement related to the incident. The goal of these requests is to obtain enough
information to help the lawyer better understand what happened and determine
whether there may, or may not, be actionable claims under the law resulting from the
shooting. However, for several years law enforcement agencies have refused to allow
inspection of public records in officer-involved shootings, instead issuing blanket
denials in response to IPRA requests. Such blanket denials are not supported by the
plain meaning of the law or any case law interpreting it. Further, a fix should be
instituted that requires that public bodies not only review and produce documents,
properly redacted, but also provide a more detailed denial communication specifying
the reasons why any redacted information is being withheld to allow a requestor to
decide whether to challenge that withholding of information.
New Mexico’s Inspection of Public Records Act (“IPRA”) has been in place
for many decades and allows “any person” to request public records from any public
body. “Public records” is broadly defined, and the Legislature has identified only a
narrow list of records that are exempt from inspection for public policy reasons.
Many agencies have an online portal through which someone may make a request,
∗
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1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 n.80 (1976) (quoting Louis L. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S
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or a written request may be submitted to the records custodian of the public body.
While the statute allows for verbal requests, the issues in this article should make
apparent why having documentation is preferable when making IPRA requests in
officer-involved shootings.
A public body must respond to every IPRA request within prescribed time
limits, though it does have the ability to request more time to comply with the request
if the request is deemed excessively broad or burdensome. To help with the
enforcement of the statute and incentivize compliance by public bodies, IPRA allows
for damages whenever an agency fails to respond or makes a denial that, when
challenged in the courts, is found to be an improper one.
This article will lay out why law enforcement agencies’ blanket denials in
response to IPRA requests for their investigation-related records are unfounded in
logic, contrary to the plain language and intent of the law, and lead to the perverse
result of breeding the very distrust in government that IPRA is intended to avoid and
remedy. The article then explores pragmatic ways to resolve law enforcement’s
actions. Specifically, it argues that New Mexico should take a page from federal case
law and establish, by amendment to the IPRA or through interpretive case law, that
public bodies, and specifically law enforcement agencies, be required to produce an
index of those documents that fall under IPRA but which the public body claims are
subject to withholding based on an exception.
The first section of this article briefly reviews the purpose and evolution of
laws that recognize or create the right to access government records, then focuses on
explaining New Mexico’s IPRA. The second section is dedicated to exploring
IPRA’s exceptions in general and the law enforcement records exception in
particular. The third section addresses the arguments made by law enforcement
agencies—including the attempts by those public bodies to claim, once they untimely
produce records, that none of the penalties available under the Act apply to their
conduct—and explains why those arguments are unavailing. The final section argues
that New Mexico should adopt an index requirement, similar to that which developed
under federal law, both as a sunlight measure in response to law enforcement
agencies evading their duties under the IPRA and to conserve judicial resources.
I. TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT: A FUNDAMENTAL PILLAR OF
DEMOCRACY
[P]opular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. 2
A.

Sunshine Laws: A Brief Primer

There is a long history, pre-dating specific legislation on the issue in the
United States, of the recognition that government operates better when its citizens
have access to its records. 3 It has long been understood that a well-informed public
2. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910).
3. See generally Joe Regalia, The Common Law Right to Information, 18 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT.
89, 90 (2015).

Winter 2020

ILLUMINATING DARK CORNERS

61

and a government that recognizes its public’s right to information is a fundamental
pillar of democracy. 4 A common law right of the public to access government
information derives from English common law 5 and has existed since the United
States Constitution was created. 6 In the twentieth century, the federal and state
governments specifically codified this right, enacting so-called “sunshine laws” that
require government agencies to disclose documents in its possession—i.e., public
records—upon request. 7
B.

New Mexico’s Sunshine Law: The Inspection of Public Records Act

While many states adopted language wholesale from the federal Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) enacted in 1966 as statutorily providing a right of access
to public records under state law, New Mexico’s sunshine law, enacted in 1947,
predates FOIA by nearly two decades and has always stood, and been interpreted,
independent of FOIA. 8 The New Mexico courts have clearly held that the IPRA
“ensures greater access to government records than does FOIA.” 9 The courts have
further held that despite their common purpose, FOIA case law is of “limited
persuasion when interpreting IPRA.” 10 Thus, because IPRA and the cases construing
it represent the law of New Mexico, it is those sources of law that frame and support
the remainder of this article’s discussion.
1. IPRA’s Purpose
In its 1993 comprehensive amendment of IPRA, the New Mexico
Legislature included an express statement explaining the purpose to be served by,
and the public policy underlying, IPRA:
Recognizing that a representative government is dependent upon
an informed electorate, the intent of the legislature in enacting the
[IPRA] is to ensure, and it is declared to be the public policy of
this state, that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible
information regarding the affairs of government and the official
acts of public officers and employees. It is the further intent of the
legislature, and it is declared to be the public policy of this state,
that to provide persons with such information is an essential

4. See Jimmy Carter, Foreword to ACCESS TO INFORMATION: A KEY TO DEMOCRACY 3 (Laura
Neuman ed., 2002).
5. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court [has]
recognized that [the] English common law right of access was transferred to the American colonies.”).
6. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993).
7. Regalia, supra note 3, at 91–92.
8. 1947 N.M. Laws, ch. 130, § 1 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (2019)).
9. See Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 28, 283 P.3d 853,
864. And as such, greater access undermines any reliance agencies try to draw from broad discretion given
under FOIA to agency withholdings. See Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120,
2018 WL 3000216, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018) (stating how defendant New Mexico Department
of Public Safety argued against release of records under a confidential law enforcement records
exception), cert. granted, S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 2018).
10. Republican Party, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 28, 283 P.3d at 864.
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function of a representative government and an integral part of the
routine duties of public officers and employees. 11
In construing the IPRA, New Mexico courts have explained that “[e]ach inquiry
starts with the presumption that public policy favors the right of inspection.” 12
IPRA’s text “underscore[s] a legislative intent to ensure that New Mexicans have the
greatest possible access to their public records.” 13 The New Mexico Supreme Court
has interpreted IPRA’s creation of a statutory right to access public records as
“intend[ing] to ensure that the public servants of New Mexico remain accountable to
the people they serve.” 14 Indeed, “New Mexico’s policy of open government is
intended to protect the public from having to rely solely on the representations of
public officials that they have acted appropriately.” 15
2. IPRA Deconstructed: The Nuts and Bolts of Fulfilling IPRA’s Goal
IPRA begins with the simple mandate that “[e]very person has a right to
inspect public records of this state.” 16 First, what are public records? They are “all
documents, papers, letters, books, maps, tapes, photographs, recordings and other
materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that are used, created,
received, maintained or held by or on behalf of any public body and relate to public
business, whether or not the records are required by law to be created or
maintained.” 17 Second, what are public bodies? They are “the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of state and local government and all advisory boards,
commissions, committees, agencies or entities created by the constitution or any
branch of government that receives public funding.” 18 Lastly, what does it meant to
inspect? “‘[I]nspect’ means to review all public records that are not excluded” by
IPRA. 19 Thus, all records created by public bodies that relate to public business,
unless they are subject to an exception, may be inspected by the public.
It does not matter who is making the request for the records. “Any person”
may submit an oral or written request to inspect public records, though public bodies
are only subject to IPRA’s penalties for failing to respond to a written request. 20 In

11. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 258, § 2 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (1993)).
12. Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 934, 242 P.3d 501 (citation
omitted).
13. San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 38, 150 N.M. 64, 257
P.3d 884.
14. Republican Party, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 12, 283 P.3d at 859 (quoting other sources).
15. ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 44, 392 P.3d 181, 191 (citation omitted).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (2019).
17. § 14-2-6(G) (2018).
18. § 14-2-6(E). Note that a private entity may also be included if they meet a nine factor, totality of
the circumstances analysis regarding entanglement. See New Mexico Foundation for Open Government
v. Corizon Health, No. A-1-CA-35951, 2019 WL 4551658, at *4 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2019) (though
a private contractor, DOC subcontractor health care provider still subject to IPRA); Pacheco v. Hudson,
2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 29, 415 P.3d 505, 511; see generally State ex rel. Toomey v. City of Truth or
Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, 287 P.3d 364.
19. § 14-2-6(C) (2018) (emphasis added); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-19 (1997) (“The text
of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.”).
20. § 14-2-8(A) (2009).
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making a request, the requester need not state a reason for wishing to inspect the
records, and the public body may not require the requester to provide a reason. 21
Indeed, a requester may request documents for no more reason than to verify that an
agency both has the documents and is complying with IPRA in fully disclosing
them. 22
a. Public Bodies’ Duties Under IPRA
IPRA requires every public body to designate at least one custodian of
records who is responsible for receiving and responding to requests and providing
“reasonable opportunities” to inspect public records. 23 The designated custodian
bears the ultimate responsibility for complying with IPRA requests. 24 IPRA demands
not only the production of public records, but their timely production as well. A
records custodian must “permit the inspection immediately or as soon as is
practicable under the circumstances, but not later than fifteen days after receiving a
written request[.]” 25 If the custodian does not permit inspection within fifteen days,
“[t]he person requesting the public records may pursue the remedies provided in
[IPRA].” 26 While the IPRA does not require an agency to create a document to have
a document responsive to a request, it does require an agency create a writing to
respond to a requester if the agency requires more time to respond to a request 27 and
when an agency denies a request. 28
Custodians must ensure not only procedural but also substantive
compliance with IPRA. 29 On a substantive level, custodians are responsible for
determining whether records in the public body’s possession are subject to
disclosure. 30 Specifically, “[r]equested public records containing information that is
exempt and nonexempt from disclosure shall be separated by the custodian prior to
inspection, and the nonexempt information shall be made available for inspection.” 31
While separating exempt from not exempt matter may be burdensome in some cases,
IPRA recognizes that it is “an essential function of a representative government and
an integral part of the routine duties of public officers and employees” to provide
access to public records. 32 Thus, the burden is a requisite of the public body under
the IPRA. This is analogous to a prejudicial evidence analysis in which all evidence
is recognized to be prejudicial but it is only that evidence which is unfairly

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

§ 14-2-8(C).
See ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 52, 392 P.3d 181, 193.
§ 14-2-7(C) (2011).
See Pacheco v. Hudson, 2018-NMSC-022, ¶ 57, 415 P.3d 505, 516.
§ 14-2-8(D) (2009).
§ 14-2-11(A) (1993).
See § 14-2-10 (1993).
§ 14-2-11(B) (1993).
See §§ 14-2-7 (2011), 14-2-9 (2013).
§ 14-2-9(A).
Id.
§ 14-2-5 (1993).
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prejudicial that, when weighed against its probative value, may be excluded. 33 The
Legislature has thus mandated that a records custodian undertake the process—
however burdensome—of reviewing and sorting records as a duty of public office, 34
and expressly provided a statutory procedure for responding to excessively
burdensome requests. 35
b. Documents That Fall Under IPRA
Draft documents must generally be released under IPRA. 36 A document that
is merely “thought processes,” such as a an offer of a contract, does not rise to the
level of a public record. 37 However, a draft letter or email string—maintained or held
by or on behalf of a public entity—constitutes a public record that is subject to
inspection. 38 “[N]either the deliberative process privilege nor the rule of reason . . .
is recognized in New Mexico.” 39 Therefore, withholding a draft letter or email on
the ground of a deliberative process privilege violates IPRA. 40 IPRA does except
matters of opinion found in personnel files, but it does not except citizen complaints
about government officials. 41 Citizen complaints are also not “letters of reference,”
for which there is an exception. 42 A jury list is a public record and the media is
entitled to inspect and publish it. 43 The State’s public records consisting of doctor’s
opinions and other medical information in personnel files are excepted under the
meaning of the IPRA statute. 44 A public employee’s privacy interests in his or her
personal position regarding union representation requires protecting union

33. Cf. N.M. R. EVID. 11-403 (relevant and probative evidence excluded when “unfairly”
prejudicial); State v. Hogervorst, 1977-NMCA-057, 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828, cert. denied, 90 N.M.
636, 567 P.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. N.M. June 24, 1977).
34. § 14-2-9(A).
35. § 14-2-10 (1993).
36. Edenburn v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 2013-NMCA-045, ¶ 23, 299 P.3d 424, 431.
37. Sanchez v. Bd. of Regents of E. N.M. Univ., 1971-NMSC-065, ¶ 17, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608.
38. See Edenburn, 2013-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 13, 26, 299 P.3d at 429, 432.
39. Id. ¶ 42, 299 P.3d at 436.
40. Id. ¶¶ 30–31, 299 P.3d at 433.
41. Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 19, 148 N.M. 934, 242 P.3d 501 (“[T]he
citizen complaints at issue are not letters of reference as that term is contemplated by the statute and,
therefore, they do not qualify for exclusion under this exception.”).
42. Id. (“The complaints were not solicited by DPS or the officer and were not intended to
recommend the officer for employment or licensing. We determine that based on the plain language of
the statute, the citizen complaints at issue are not letters of reference as that term is contemplated by the
statute and, therefore, they do not qualify for exclusion under this exception.”).
43. State ex rel. N.M. Press Ass’n v. Kaufman, 1982-NMSC-060, ¶ 30, 98 N.M. 261, 648 P.2d 300
(citation omitted) (“Furthermore, since the names of the jurors were announced in open court and filed as
a public record, the procedures failed the third prong of the test. Every citizen has a right to inspect public
records, with certain well-defined exceptions. There is no question that the jury list is a public record and
that the Media was entitled to inspect and publish it.”).
44. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 10, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (“The
intent of the Legislature to exempt doctors’ opinions and other medical information in personnel files
from disclosure is evident from an analysis of this statute, and the intent comports with common sense
and reasoning as well as with good public policy.”).
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representation petitions from public disclosure. 45 Other laws may provide an
exception a public body may use to withhold documents that would otherwise be
responsive to an IPRA request, if the express language or intent of that law so
indicates. 46
II. HOW IPRA IS ENFORCED: CIVIL ACTIONS AND DAMAGES
IPRA grants authority to the attorney general and district attorneys to bring
an action to enforce IPRA. 47 IPRA also expressly allows a requester whose written
request “has been denied” to bring an action to enforce IPRA. 48 A request “has been
denied” when a public entity does not respond to a written IPRA request within the
deadlines contained within the statute, or fails to provide a timely writing explaining
the denial of the request or any part thereof, 49 or fails to produce all responsive
records, whether through intentional or inadvertent withholding of responsive
records. 50 There is no requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit. 51 IPRA empowers district courts to “issue a writ of mandamus or order an
injunction or other appropriate remedy to enforce the provisions of [IPRA].” 52
If the requester’s suit is successful, “[t]he court shall award damages, costs,
and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 53 “Shall” is mandatory. 54 This provision of IPRA
has been described as a fee-shifting provision intended to place “the imposition of
the cost of litigation on the party who unsuccessfully resists a statutorily-compelled,
socially beneficial action.” 55 The provision is consonant with the understanding that
IPRA is “intended to ensure that the public servants of New Mexico remain
accountable to the people they serve.” 56 Moreover, it encourages compliance with
IPRA and discourages abuse by shifting the obligation to pay the requester’s fees to
the public body that wrongfully withheld the requested records. 57 An action to
enforce IPRA cannot be rendered moot simply because the requester accepts
belatedly produced records after a complaint and dispositive motions have been filed,
as that approach would neutralize the Legislature’s aim to create “private attorneys
45. City of Las Cruces v. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd., 1996-NMSC-024, ¶ 11, 121 N.M. 688, 917
P.2d 451.
46. Id. ¶ 12, 917 P.2d at 455 (“We hold that Section 14-2-1(F), ‘as otherwise provided by law,’
incorporates Regulation 1.17, an administrative regulation that effectuates the Legislature’s intent in
enacting the Public Employee Bargaining Act: to protect the right of public employees to organize for
collective bargaining purposes. Additionally, we hold that any benefit to the public from inspecting the
representation petition would be significantly outweighed by the police officers’ privacy interest.”).
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-12(A)(1) (1993).
48. § 14-2-12(A)(2).
49. § 14-2-11 (1993).
50. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 35, 433 P.3d 320, 333.
51. § 14-2-12(C).
52. § 14-2-12(B).
53. § 14-2-12(D).
54. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-4 (1997) (providing that, under the Uniform Statute and Rule
Construction Act, “shall” expresses an obligation or requirement).
55. Rio Grande Sun v. Jemez Mountains Pub. Sch. Dist., 2012-NMCA-091, ¶ 9, 287 P.3d 318, 320.
56. Faber v. King, 2015-NMSC-015, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d 173, 180 (quoting San Juan Agric. Water Users
Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884).
57. See ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 35, 392 P.3d 181, 190 (citations omitted).
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general” incentivized to enforce all provisions of the Act. 58 The disclosure issue
under IPRA is one of public importance that is capable of repetition yet evading
review. 59 And, because an individual making a request under IPRA is inherently at
a disadvantage when it comes to knowing what records an agency has, our courts
have held that a citizen has the right to challenge whether an agency has truthfully
identified the records it does have when that agency has claimed an exception under
the Act. 60 If the public body makes a denial based on exemptions, in good faith or
not, that are later adjudicated to not have existed, damages, costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees are available. 61
IPRA additionally provides for the possibility of recovering statutory
damages of up to one hundred dollars per day against a public body that fails to
timely, and completely, respond to a request when the failure is determined by the
district court to be “unreasonable.” 62 Considered a “penalty” against the public body
for failing to comply with its obligations under IPRA, the main purpose served by
IPRA’s statutory damage provision is to deter inappropriate non-disclosure of
requested records. 63 The provision “create[s] a financial disincentive to failing to
respond in a way that fulfills the public body’s substantive obligation under IPRA,” 64
i.e., its obligation to provide “the greatest possible information” to the public
“regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of public officers and
employees.” 65 The penalty evinces the Legislature’s intent that public bodies follow
both the language and intent of the law. 66
A. IPRA’s Exceptions
The 1947 enactment provided a right to inspect all public records of the
state and contained only two exceptions: one for records “pertaining to physical or
mental examinations and medical treatment of persons confined to any institutions,”
and one for records exempt from disclosure “as otherwise provided by law.” 67 In
1973, the New Mexico Legislature added two additional exceptions to the general
rule of access: (1) “letters of reference concerning employment, licensing or permit;”

58. See San Juan Water Users, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 12, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884 (citing OFFICE
ATT’Y GEN., NEW MEXICO INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDE 42
(2015).
59. Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 283 P.3d 853, 858.
60. See Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 44, 392 P.3d at 191.
61. See San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV, No. A-1-CA-35839, 2019 WL 2089540,
at *9–11 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-11(C) (1993); see Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA002, ¶ 35, 433 P.3d 320, 333.
63. See Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 34, 433 P.3d at 333.
64. Id.
65. § 14-2-5 (1993).
66. See Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 33, 433 P.3d at 332.
67. 1947 N.M. Laws ch. 130, § 1 (as codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-1 (1953)).
OF THE N.M.
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and (2) “letters or memorandums which are matters of opinion in personnel files or
students’ cumulative files[.]” 68
In 1977, the New Mexico Supreme Court was presented with a challenge
under IPRA from a student reporter against his university seeking personnel records
to which an exception to IPRA applied to some documents, but not others. 69 The
Newsome court concluded that existing exemptions to disclosure were insufficient
and adopted an “implied rule of reason” to balance the public’s interest in disclosure
against privacy interests. 70 In the same opinion, the court called on the Legislature
to abrogate the newly formulated, judge-made rule by amending the statute to
delineate “what records are subject to public inspection and those that should be kept
confidential in the public interest.” 71
The Legislature took up Newsome’s call and amended the exemptions to
IPRA. 72 Consequently, courts may no longer apply the “rule of reason” and are
instead to “restrict their analysis to whether disclosure under IPRA may be withheld
because of a specific exception contained within IPRA, or statutory or regulatory
exceptions, or privileges adopted by this Court or grounded in the constitution,” 73
and the absence in the law of an enumerated exemption to public access may not be
read as an oversight to be corrected by the courts. 74 The Legislature in so amending
IPRA over the years has adjusted the balance between privacy and public access as
it saw fit, taking back that responsibility from the courts. The IPRA currently lists
eight narrowly 75 codified exceptions to the mandate that “[e]very person has a right
to inspect public records of this state” 76: 1) records of treatment of confined persons,
2) letters of reference, 3) opinion documents in personnel or student files, 4) law
enforcement records, 5) records covered by the Confidential Materials Act, 6)
specifically protected records, 7) records comprising tactical response plans or
procedures that could be used to facilitate the planning or execution of a terrorist
attack, and 8) other records provided for by the New Mexico Constitution, statutes,
or rules. 77 The Legislature clearly carved out areas that either touched on personal
opinion or sensitive information, and information where that body felt that the
detrimental effects of its disclosure outweighed the public policy of transparency and
accountability. Exceptions should always be construed narrowly to give the broadest

68. 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 271, § 1; see State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 8, 90
N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236, superseded by statute, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 47, § 3, as recognized in
Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 853, 860.
69. Newsome, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 1, 568 P.2d at 1239–40.
70. Id. ¶¶ 28, 33, 37, 568 P.2d at 1243, 1244.
71. See id. ¶ 33, 568 P.2d at 1243.
72. See 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 47, § 3; 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 260, § 1; 1998 N.M. Laws, ch. 3, § 1;
1999 N.M. Laws, ch. 158, § 1; 2003 N.M. Laws, ch. 288, § 1; 2005 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, § 1; 2011 N.M.
Laws, ch. 134, § 2.
73. Republican Party, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d at 860.
74. See id. ¶¶ 51–52, 283 P.3d at 870–71.
75. See Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 7, 148 N.M. 934, 242 P.3d 501
(“IPRA itself contains twelve narrow statutory exceptions enumerated in Section 14-2-1(A).”).
76. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (2019).
77. See § 14-2-1(A)-(H).
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possible meaning to the general statute. 78 These exceptions are few, narrow, and,
unless provided for elsewhere in New Mexico law, leave little room for any public
body to withhold records that fall under IPRA.
1. IPRA’s Law Enforcement Exception, Specifically
Despite the Newsome court’s call to the Legislature to undo its “implied
rule of reason” test, it was not until the 1993 enactment that the Legislature included
an exception for law enforcement records. 79 Since 1993, IPRA has excepted from
inspection
law enforcement records that reveal confidential sources, methods,
information or individuals accused but not charged with a crime.
Law enforcement records include evidence in any form received
or compiled in connection with a criminal investigation or
prosecution by a law enforcement or prosecuting agency,
including inactive matters or closed investigations to the extent
that they contain the information listed [in this paragraph]. 80
Though the plain language “broadly defines” what is considered a law enforcement
record, the exception expressly limits what law enforcement records may be claimed
as exempt from inspection under IPRA to only those “that reveal confidential
sources, methods, or information or individuals accused but not charged with a
crime.” 81 Law enforcement records that do not fall into one of the four enumerated
categories of exempt information plainly are not exempt from inspection. 82
The law enforcement records exception was amended and clarified in 2019.
Effective July 1, 2019, the IPRA exempts from inspection:
portions of law enforcement records that reveal: (1) confidential
sources, methods or information; or (2) before charges are filed,
names, address, contact information, or protected personal
identifier information . . . of individuals who are: (a) accused but
not charged with a crime; or (b) victims of or non-law-enforcement
witness to [specified] alleged crime[s]. 83
The legislature also made changes in the definition of law enforcement records,
deleting the word “paragraph” and replacing it with: “subsection; provided that the

78. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 27, 125 N.M. 401, 962
P.2d 1236 (“[S]trict or narrow construction is usually applied to exceptions to the general operation of a
law.”).
79. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 260, § 1.
80. See id.
81. See Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *4 (N.M. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2019).
82. See Republican Party v. Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 853,
860.
83. 2019 N.M. Laws, Ch. 27, §1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (2019)).
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presence of such information on a law enforcement record does not exempt the
record from inspection.” 84
There are two notable changes to the exception. First, the Legislature’s
addition of the words “portions of” 85 to begin the exception is significant in that it
reveals that the Legislature intends for the law enforcement records exception to be
construed narrowly, not broadly. 86 This construction of the Legislature’s intent is
further reinforced by the second notable addition: the Legislature’s pronouncement
that “that the presence of [exempt] information on a law enforcement record does
not exempt the record from inspection.” 87 In other words, public bodies may not
withhold an entire record—much less entire investigation files—simply because the
record contains information that may be exempt from inspection. Only those
“portions of” the record that fall within an exception may be withheld, and then only
through the procedures specifically prescribed by IPRA. 88
2. Procedures for Denying Requests and Withholding Documents Under
An Exception
IPRA prescribes specific procedures with which a custodian must comply
in order to withhold public records from inspection based on a claimed exemption
and still be considered “in compliance” with IPRA. 89 A custodian must separate
“information that is exempt and nonexempt from disclosure” and must timely make
all nonexempt information available for inspection. 90 Implicit in this requirement is
a threshold obligation to first identify in good faith all records that are responsive to
the request. If a request or any portion thereof is denied by the custodian, the
custodian must “provide the requester with a written explanation of the denial”
within the applicable time period established by IPRA. 91 At a minimum, the written
explanation must include a description of the records sought and must identify by
name and title or position the person or persons “responsible for the denial[.]” 92 As
noted by the New Mexico Court of Appeals, “[d]enials are valuable informationgathering tools.” 93 As such, and because IPRA’s goal is to provide “the greatest
possible information” to the public, 94 written denials are an integral and substantive

84. S.B. 118, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019).
85. Id.
86. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 27, § 1 (adding “portions” to the beginning of the exception); N.M. LEGIS.
FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT OF S.B. 118, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (2019) [hereinafter S.B. 118
FISCAL IMPACT REPORT] (“[T]he law enforcement records exception applies to portions of . . . records .
. . [and] the presence of information covered by the exception does not exempt the record from
inspection.”); see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-18 (1997) (“A statute or rule is construed, if possible, to: . . .
give effect to its entire text; and avoid an unconstitutional, absurd or unachievable result.”).
87. S.B. 118 FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 86, at 2.
88. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-9(A) (2013), 14-2-11(B) (1993); Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *3 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2019).
89. Faber v. King, 2015-NMSC-015, ¶ 30, 348 P.3d 173, 181.
90. § 14-2-9(A).
91. § 14-2-11(B).
92. § 14-2-11(B)(1), (2).
93. ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d 181, 190.
94. § 14-2-5 (1993).
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part of responding to any IPRA request. 95 Much as providing a “perfunctory
‘response’” to an IPRA request is “not a response at all,” 96 providing a perfunctory
written denial that fails to provide “the greatest possible information” about the basis
for the denial is equally noncompliant with the intent of IPRA. “The expectation
established by IPRA is that records custodians will diligently undertake their
responsibility to process and fully respond to requests, including determining what
public records are responsive to the request and what records or portions thereof may
be exempt from disclosure . . . .” 97
Consonant with the purpose and structure of IPRA, the burden is on the
custodian to demonstrate both that he or she has followed the procedures for
separating exempt and nonexempt information, 98 and that there exists a valid reason
for nondisclosure. 99 Initially, the custodian must demonstrate that he or she has
undertaken his or her statutory duty to conduct a document-by-document review of
the records that are responsive to a request. 100 Failure to demonstrate compliance
with that threshold obligation may, on its own, subject the custodian to liability under
IPRA. 101 Upon diligently undertaking a document-by-document review, the
custodian must then be able to articulate the basis upon which records are being
withheld from inspection, i.e., what basis exists for claiming records to be exempt. 102
Notably, there is no provision in IPRA authorizing an agency to make a
temporary denial of a public records request. In fact, such a response makes the
request “deemed denied.” 103 IPRA also does not allow for incomplete or less than
full response to requests. 104 And there is no provision in IPRA that allows an agency
to make a preliminary and blanket denial for records in its possession. Instead, the
statute requires that an agency undertake an analysis of the documents requested and
determine what information, not documents or files, shall and must be produced. 105
“Requested public records containing information that is exempt and nonexempt
from disclosure shall be separated by the custodian prior to inspection, and the

95. See ACLU, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d at 190; Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019NMCA-002, ¶ 30, 433 P.3d 320, 331–32.
96. Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 41, 433 P.3d at 335.
97. Id. ¶ 31, 433 P.3d at 332 (emphasis added).
98. See id.; Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *5 (N.M.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2019).
99. See City of Farmington v. Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 349, 210 P.3d
246 (“The burden is upon the custodian to justify why the records sought to be examined should not be
furnished.”), overruled by Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, 283
P.3d 853.
100. See Noll, 2019 WL 1615040, at *5.
101. See id. at *5–6.
102. See State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, ¶ 35, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (“The
burden is upon the custodian to justify why the records sought to be examined should not be furnished.”),
superseded by statute, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 47, § 3, as recognized in Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation
& Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 853, 860).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-11(A) (1993).
104. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 31, 433 P.3d 320, 332.
105. See § 14-2-9(A) (2013); see also Jones v. Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018
WL 3000216, at *5 (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018) (Vargas, J., dissenting), cert. granted S-1-SC-37094
(N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018).
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nonexempt information shall be made available for inspection.” 106 The legislative
intent is that even the presence of information that may fall under an exception does
not itself make the sought-after record exempt from disclosure. 107
The exceptions are not merely formulaic, and how an agency labels or
designates a record is also immaterial to whether it is exempt from inspection under
IPRA. 108 What matters is not where the public record is located—e.g., in a particular
type of file, such as a personnel file or an investigation file—but rather the nature of
the record that determines whether the record is exempt from inspection. 109 In
considering a case where the New Mexico Department of Public Safety (“DPS”)
denied a request to inspect citizen complaints by claiming that they fell under the
“matters of opinion in personnel files” exception, 110 the New Mexico Court of
Appeals explained that “[t]o hold that any matter of opinion could be placed in a
personnel file, and thereby avoid disclosure under IPRA, would violate the broad
mandate of disclosure embodied in the statute.” 111
III. BLANKET DENIALS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
VIOLATE IPRA
In direct contravention of IPRA’s plain language and case law interpreting
it, New Mexico law enforcement agencies, and DPS in particular, have taken the
position that the “law enforcement records” exception can be broadly read to support
blanket denials of IPRA requests due to an “on-going investigation.” 112 In particular,
requests for records in officer-involved shootings are routinely met with blanket
denials by these public bodies in clear violation of the procedural and substantive
mandates of IPRA. 113 Cases regarding officer-involved shootings are not going away
anytime soon, as New Mexico led the nation in 2018 in the rate of fatal shootings by

106. § 14-2-9(A).
107. S.B. 118 FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, supra note 86, at 2.
108. Edenburn v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 2013-NMCA-045, ¶ 23, 299 P.3d 424, 431 (“[A] document’s
designation as a ‘non-record’ for the purposes of the Public Records Act has no impact on its status as a
public record under IPRA.”).
109. Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 21, 148 N.M. 934, 242 P.3d 501.
110. N.M. STAT. ANN. §14-2-1(C) (2019).
111. Cox, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 21, 242 P.3d at 506.
112. See, e.g., Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *5 (N.M.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2019); Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL
3000216, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018) cert. granted S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018);
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree at 7, Anchondo v. N.M. Dep’t of Public Safety,
D-101-CV-2018-00661 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 2019) (finding “willful failure” by DPS to
produce records despite invocation of exception for ongoing criminal investigation); Order on Motion to
Compel Defendant New Mexico Department of Public Safety’s Responses at 3, Rio Grande Sun v N.M.
Dep’t of Public Safety, D-117-CV-2017-00245 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2019); Stipulated Order
Permitting In Camera Review, Adams ex rel. Bailon v. N.M Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01508
(N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 5, 2019) (DPS’s claim of IPRA exception denied); Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for an Index and for Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. N.M Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01510 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 2019) (asserting IPRA exemption for
“ongoing criminal investigation”); Duran v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-00450 (N.M. 1st Jud.
Dist. Ct.).
113. See, e.g., Jones, 2018 WL 3000216, at *1.
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law enforcement officers, and has been either number one or two since 2015. 114 DPS
investigates the “vast majority” of these shootings. 115 DPS routinely provides blanket
denials for requests of any information regarding the shootings or its investigations
into them.
The notion that a law enforcement agency, or any public body, may
withhold an entire investigation file without establishing the application of the law
enforcement exception to every record contained within that file raises obvious and
serious issues. For example, an agency may hold an investigation open to preclude a
plaintiff from ever being able to obtain the information necessary to bring a lawsuit
against a public official or governmental agency within the statute of limitations. 116
Such a tactic to justify withholding an entire investigation file forces potential
litigants and their lawyers to bring lawsuits based on an underlying incident that has
not been fully investigated prior to filing lawsuits that, were they armed with
knowledge of the facts of an incident, lawyers and their clients might well not have
filed. For the lawyers involved, it challenges their ability to meet their obligations to
do due diligence before filing suit. 117
New Mexico’s law enforcement agencies, and specifically DPS, have
engaged in a pattern of completely withholding the documents unless and until those
actions are challenged through IPRA litigation. 118 DPS has taken many tacks in its
IPRA arguments, but three key arguments are consistently made. The first is that
even the possibility that any request for documents in an ongoing investigation could
lead to one of the four enumerated types of exempt information being disseminated
is a sufficient basis for a denial. DPS’s broad reading runs counter to a commonsense statutory interpretation and de facto creates a blanket “ongoing investigation”
exception that IPRA does not provide for. 119 The second is that dicta in the Jones
case created a broad “ongoing criminal investigation” exception, but that too runs
contrary to the narrow exception language in the statute. 120 The third is that because
the Attorney General or the local district attorney decides whether or not to prosecute
a case, it is not the law enforcement agency’s place to produce any documents
114. Elise Kaplan, NM Once Again No. 1 in Fatal Police Shootings, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 10, 2019,
11:58
PM),
https://www.abqjournal.com/1266910/nm-ranks-no-1-for-fatal-police-shootings.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZX7-4KEV] (“In 2018, New Mexico ranked first in the nation, finishing the year with
20 fatal shootings by police officers around the state, a rate of 9.59 per 1 million people. . . . Connecticut
had the smallest number of fatal police shootings—0.”).
115. Id.
116. See Amended Complaint, Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, D-202-CV-2016-00086 (N.M. 2nd
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016) at 9–12 (lawsuit by former records custodian alleging having received orders
to engage in IPRA misconduct by city officials); Cf. ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, 392
P.3d 181.
117. See, e.g., N.M. R. EVID. 1-011. Litigants and their lawyers must have a good faith basis for the
allegations made in any pleading, including a complaint that initiates a claim of police misconduct.
118. See, e.g., Stipulated Order Permitting In Camera Review, Adams ex rel. Bailon v. N.M Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01508 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 5, 2019); Jones v. City of Albuquerque
Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL 3000216, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018), cert. granted
S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018); Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D101-CV-2018-01510; Anchondo v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-00661; Rio
Grande Sun v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-117-CV-2017-00245.
119. Sanchez, D-101-CV-2018-01510.
120. Jones, 2018 WL 3000216, at *1.
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responsive to an IPRA request because the information might affect that prosecution.
None of these arguments is supported under well-established standards of statutory
interpretation or by the case law on which DPS relies.
A. IPRA’s Language Does Not Support Withholding Any Information, Let
Alone Entire Investigation Files, Based On an “Ongoing Investigation”
IPRA and its exceptions are clear and should be construed narrowly, and
not broadly as law enforcement agencies responding to IPRA requests have made it
a practice of doing. 121 The purpose of the Act is to “ensure . . . that all persons are
entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and
the official acts of public officers and employees.” 122 As such, “[t]he burden is upon
the custodian to justify why the records sought to be examined should not be
furnished.” 123 Like the other exceptions set out in the Act, the law enforcement
exception must be construed according to its plain terms. 124 Yet, there are a growing
number of cases in New Mexico in which law enforcement agencies have taken it
upon themselves to construe this section of IPRA as a justification for making a
blanket denial to provide records in violation of IPRA. 125 Law enforcement’s
construction of the law enforcement exception requires the reading in of language
that does not exist in the exception or defining words in the statute more broadly than
those words in their context can be read.
Any argument that an “ongoing investigation” warrants special
consideration under IPRA is not anchored in the language of the statute. 126 Informing
all analysis of the law enforcement exception is the overarching tenet and expressly
stated public policy of the Legislature that IPRA favors informing the public. 127
Thus, an analysis starts from an understanding that an agency has a duty to provide
all information, unless that information is specifically excepted. The argument to
withhold entire files unreasonably seeks to broaden what is clear and narrow
language. The language in the exception applies only to records “that reveal

121. Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 27, 125 N.M. 401,
962 P.2d 1236; State ex rel. Toomey v. City of Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶ 22, 287 P.3d
364, 370 (“We emphasize, however, that [the] IPRA should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes, and courts should avoid narrow definitions that would defeat the intent of the Legislature.”).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (1993).
123. City of Farmington v. Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 349, 210 P.3d
246, overruled by Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d
853, 860.
124. Bank of N.Y. v. Romero, 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 40, 320 P.3d 1, 11 (citation omitted) (“[W]hen a
statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, [the Supreme Court] must give effect to that
language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.”).
125. See, e.g., Adams v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. D-101-CV-2018-01508; Jones v. City of
Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL 3000216, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018),
cert. granted S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018); Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, No. D-101-CV-2018-01510; Anchondo v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-201800661; Rio Grande Sun v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. D-117-CV-2017-00245.
126. Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *6 (N.M. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 2019) (“Nothing in the plain language of IPRA authorizes a blanket denial of public access to
records, express or implied, solely because those records are the subject of an ongoing investigation.”).
127. § 14-2-5.
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confidential sources, methods, or information,” or contact information regarding
either a) individuals accused but not charged with a crime, or b) victims of, or nonlaw-enforcement witnesses to, alleged sex crimes or alleged stalking. 128 The
definition of “reveal” is to “to make something secret or hidden publicly or generally
known.” 129 The statute does not contain any qualifying language with regard to its
use of the word “reveal.” And the language is in the present tense. This is significant
because it indicates that at the time of reviewing a document, as an agency must do
when presented with an IPRA request, 130 an agency must know that the document in
fact reveals one of the four sources of information. If it does not, the agency must
allow that document to be inspected. This is the simple, plain reading of the first
sentence of the law enforcement exception.
Plainly, the exception is not concerned with the phase of the investigation,
but with the actual content of the material withheld. The second sentence is nothing
more than a definition of which records are contemplated. The Legislature defined
information within an investigation that could be exempt to include “inactive matters
or closed investigations,” but only “to the extent that” they “reveal confidential
sources, methods, or information; or individuals accused but no charged with a
crime.” 131 By stating that the exception includes “inactive matters and closed
investigations,” it implies that it also includes active investigations. 132 The statute
does not support any argument that the phase of the investigation matters or that what
the document must reveal depends upon the phase of the investigation. In fact, the
statute does not distinguish between open, closed, active, inactive or otherwise
ongoing investigations. The statute is not concerned with what phase the
investigation is in, but instead extends to all phases. Any argument that the analysis
changes when an investigation is in the early phase finds no support in the statute.
The law enforcement exception is plainly not a broad exception; rather it is
a limited exception allowing law enforcement to withhold only “records that reveal
confidential sources, methods, information or individuals accused but not charged
with a crime.” 133 The new statutory language further limits the applicability of the
exception to only those “portions” of documents or records containing any of the
specifically identified information. 134 A reading of the “law enforcement exception”
as allowing anything other than a withholding of the specific information falling
within the exception, not full documents or files, ignores both the plain language and
context of the law enforcement exception as well as case law interpreting IPRA since
its enactment. 135 In analyzing IPRA, courts must “restrict their analysis to whether
disclosure under IPRA may be withheld because of a specific exception contained
within IPRA, or statutory or regulatory exceptions, or privileges adopted by this

128. § 14-2-1(D).
129. Reveal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
130. See § 14-2-9(A) (2013).
131. § 14-2-1(D) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 27, §1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1).
135. Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc’y, 2009-NMSC-036, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d
361 (providing that a statute should be considered “in reference to the statute as a whole,” and read
together with related sections “so that all the parts are given effect”).
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Court or grounded in the constitution.” 136 If the Legislature had wanted to create a
broad investigation exception, it would have used broad language. And in fact, it did
so in the second sentence of the exception when it defined the records to which the
exception may apply. Although “law enforcement records” are broadly defined, law
enforcement records that reveal individuals accused but not charged with a crime are
exempt, and only “to the extent that” they do so. 137 And since these terms must be
given their ordinary meaning, 138 it cannot be ignored that the broad definition of
records does not relate back to the previous sentence that defines what those records
must reveal in order to be exempt. However, law enforcement agencies are making
the argument that an ongoing investigation exemption can be derived from the
portion of Section 14-2-1(D) that exempts “law enforcement records that reveal .
. . individuals accused but not charged with a crime.” Law enforcement makes its
argument by ignoring the plain language of the statute and expanding the statutory
phrase that insulates records from public access to include all materials
“surrounding,” “pertaining to,” “related to,” or “connected with,” “individuals
accused but not charged with a crime.” This is contrary to the established cannons of
construction in which interpretation of a statute should neither read out existing
language nor, as the argument to withhold entire files relies on, read in language that
is not there. 139
B. The Romero Decision Does Not Support Blanket Denials Under IPRA
Until Noll, a 2019 New Mexico Court of Appeals decision on point, the
closest case to take on the issue of the law enforcement exception since the 1993
amendment was Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City of Santa Fe. 140 Notably,
Romero did not involve an IPRA enforcement action. Rather, Romero involved a
discovery dispute over police investigative materials regarding a still-active criminal
investigation into the disappearance of a seven-year-old boy. In that particular
discovery context, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether either the
New Mexico Constitution or the Rules of Evidence provided an express or implied
“law enforcement privilege” that would allow the defendant police department to
withhold in its entirety its on-going investigation file. 141 The Court found no such
privilege in the New Mexico Constitution, and while it noted that the Rules of
Evidence provide protection for individual pieces of investigatory materials and
information, it concluded that the Rules of Evidence “do not afford complete
protection from disclosure for all on-going criminal investigatory materials obtained
by law enforcement.” 142 Despite concluding that no privilege existed to protect on136. Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 853, 860.
137. § 14-2-1(D).
138. State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863.
139. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28, 125 N.M. 401, 962
P.2d 1236 (internal citation and punctuation omitted) (“Statutes must be construed so that no part of the
statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous . . . [and] we will not read into a statute or ordinance
language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.”).
140. 2006-NMSC-028, 139 N.M. 671, 137 P.3d 611.
141. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14, 137 P.3d at 613, 616.
142. Id. ¶ 13, 137 P.3d at 616 (“[W]e can find no implied privilege in the Constitution for the protection
of local law enforcement investigatory materials.”).
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going criminal investigative material from disclosure in discovery, the Court went
on to exercise its power of superintending control “to protect the confidentiality of
. . . information against unwarranted disclosure.” 143 In doing so, it turned to IPRA’s
law enforcement exception to “guide the court in appraising public policy concerns”
related to disclosing potentially sensitive information obtained by law
enforcement. 144 The Court concluded that “the IPRA exception for law enforcement
records in a criminal investigation is illustrative of a vitally important policy concern,
leading to immunity from discovery of some police investigative materials in civil
litigation.” 145 It then expressly stated that such immunity “is not absolute.” 146
Despite Romero’s clear distinguishability and the Court’s limited discussion—in
dictum—of IPRA, it is the Romero case that agencies such as DPS have relied upon
as somehow justifying their attempts to expand the narrowly worded IPRA law
enforcement exception.
C. Law Enforcement Cannot Pawn Its IPRA Duties Off on Other Agencies
Another argument made by law enforcement agencies to support their
blanket denials has been that because the Attorney General or the local district
attorney decide whether or not to prosecute a criminal case, it is not the law
enforcement agency’s place to produce any documents responsive to an IPRA
request because the information might affect that prosecution. 147 This argument is
twofold. It shoehorns entire investigation files into the law enforcement exception
because some information in an investigation might turn out to reveal “sources,
methods, information and individuals,” and based on that possibility, all the
information “must remain ‘confidential’” during an “ongoing investigation to avoid
jeopardizing it.” 148 It also attempts to shirk the clear duty of the agency in receipt of
the IPRA request by directing the decision making process to another agency. These
arguments demand overreaching discretion be given to any law enforcement agency
to label documents as part of an ongoing investigation to avoid compliance with
IPRA. These arguments also seek to render the monetary enforcement provisions
moot. Such a reading of the statute is contrary to its plain meaning as well as its
intent and creates an enormous hole in the citizenry’s ability to obtain records under
the IPRA from any law enforcement agency when all an agency must do is keep an
investigation open, or claim that it is, to hide every single document in that file.
And such concerns are not unfounded. There are cases in which entire files
have been withheld by an agency, and the denial letter simply provides the language
of Section 14-2-1(A)(4) (now Section 14-2-1(D)) as its justification, when the

143. Id. ¶ 15, 137 P.3d at 617 (quoting In re Motion for a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1980-NMSC-010,
¶ 11, 94 N.M. 1, 606 P.2d 539).
144. Id. ¶ 18, 137 P.3d at 618.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id. ¶ 19, 137 P.3d at 618.
147. Response to Plaintiff’s Motion For An Index And For Summary Judgment, Sanchez ex rel.
Sanchez v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01510 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018), at
8 (“[I]t is not feasible to predict, in advance, whether certain items of evidence may ultimately turn out to
be key pieces of evidence, crucial to a criminal investigation for a prosecution.”).
148. Id.
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requester was asking for information regarding an officer-involved shooting. 149 In
Adams, the IPRA requester filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability
against the agency based on its blanket denial of the records requested, and within
two weeks, the requester received an invoice for the entire investigation file,
evidencing the agency’s willingness to produce the records requested. 150 This type
of gaming—withholding documents until challenged, clearly showing that no
exception applied—is also used by agencies in their arguments that there is no
support for damages against the agencies for their conduct. 151 The most outlandish
conduct has been brought to light by a former records custodian who brought an
employment-related retaliation lawsuit against the agency he worked for, alleging
his superiors often falsely answered IPRA requests under his name and ordered him
to withhold or delay production of certain materials to requesters without lawful
justification. 152
In essence, the law enforcement agencies’ arguments described above distill
down to their claims that they are unable, but in reality simply unwilling, to
undertake any kind of analysis of what information falls within the four specific
categories of information detailed in the law enforcement exception. To do so, they
say, is too burdensome, and they cannot know what words a witness stated, or which
evidence gathered, might affect an investigation. 153 Yet, agencies have been on
notice since 2011 that they must “diligently” respond to requests including
undertaking an analysis of which records are responsive and which fall under an
exception. 154 And a public body that provides an incomplete or inadequate response
is not in compliance as well. 155 Further, the broadening argument seeks to allow an
agency to shirk its responsibility under the statute to undertake some analysis of the
information to determine what does or does not fall within the exception before
producing whole or redacted documents and files, contrary to clear language in the
statute that such an analysis must be undertaken. 156 In fact, the courts have repeatedly
held that the analysis is required by the Act, and that the critical factor is the nature
of each document itself—thus imposing the duty on agencies to review documents

149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Adams v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. D-101-CV-2018-01508 (DPS
produced the entire investigation file within weeks of Plaintiff’s filed motion for summary judgment).
151. See, e.g., id.; Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL 3000216
(N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018), cert. granted, S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018); Noll v. New
Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. D-101-CV-2015-02403 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 2016); Noll
v. New Mexico Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 19,
2019).
152. Amended Complaint, Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, D-202-CV-2016-00086 (N.M. 2nd Jud.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016).
153. Response to Plaintiff’s Motion For An Index And For Summary Judgment, Sanchez ex rel.
Sanchez v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01510 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018), at
8.
154. Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 31, 433 P.3d 320, 322 (citing San Juan
Agric. Water Users Ass’n, 2011-NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884).
155. Id. ¶ 33, 433 P.3d at 332.
156. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-9 (2013).
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prior to any denial. 157 Not only must an agency follow the language of the exception,
the exception cannot be read to ignore the rest of the statute. 158 Nor can an agency
ignore that the statute has been amended to clarify that only portions of a record or
document may be withheld, codifying redaction and mandating review of the
records. 159 These actions, and arguments, have been recently disagreed with by
district courts and the court of appeals. 160
Thus, although some materials in an ongoing investigation might reveal a
confidential informant, a confidential tactical plan, or some other “confidential
information” within the meaning of the statute’s law enforcement exception, IPRA
simply does not permit the denial of a public records request in its entirety based
solely on the investigation’s existence and that phantom possibility. 161 If, for
example, an agency’s videos or witness interviews contain information that may
cross-contaminate witnesses if revealed, the agency cannot make a blanket refusal to
produce records or a file, but is required to redact that information and produce the
nonexempt portions of the public record. 162 There is no allowance in the statute, or
in the case law that has interpreted it, for an agency to refuse to review the documents
in the first instance, make a blanket denial based on the possibility that some material
might fall under the exception, and withhold those documents or portions thereof that
are responsive to the request and not even claimed to be subject to an exception.
Moreover, there is simply nothing in IPRA that permits an agency to deny a request
by pawning its statutory responsibility onto another agency.
D. Recent and Ongoing IPRA Litigation Regarding the Law Enforcement
Records Exception
The courts are now grappling with what to do with these cases as they make
their way through the New Mexico Court of Appeals. 163
In Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, the defendants alleged the
existence of an ongoing law enforcement investigation into an APD shooting to

157. E.g., Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 7, 148 N.M. 934, 242 P.3d 501;
Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 31, 433 P.3d at 322.
158. See Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (“We look first to the plain meaning of the statute’s words, and we
construe the provisions of the Act together to produce a harmonious whole.”).
159. Cf. 2019 N.M. Laws ch. 27, § 1.
160. See Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040 (N.M. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 2019); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree at 6, Anchondo v. N.M. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety, No. D-101-CV-2018-00661 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 2019) (concluding DPS
violated IPRA in releasing some information to media outlets and denying all records to Plaintiff).
161. Cf. Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL 3000216, at *3
(N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018), cert. granted S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018). Jones,
however, is a unique case in which the FBI was involved and timing of production of a privilege log was
based on the FBI’s investigation or a date certain set by the court, not by DPS’s conduct. Id. (“[T]he trial
court also ordered that if the FBI failed to complete its investigation by January 15, 2015, then DPS would
be required to produce a privilege log to Plaintiff ‘providing a description of the documents withheld and
the basis therefore.’”).
162. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-9(A) (2013).
163. See Jones, 2018 WL 3000216; Noll, 2019 WL 1615040.
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evade disclosing discovery materials. 164 The trial court held that investigative
documents would have to be turned over to the plaintiffs by a certain date, the time
the court had been told that the ongoing law enforcement investigation would be
concluded. 165 If the investigation was still ongoing, however, then:
DPS would be required to produce a privilege log to Plaintiff
“providing a description of the documents withheld and the basis
therefore[,]” which Plaintiff would then be given an opportunity
to challenge. And concurrently with the production of the privilege
log, [production of] the records for an in camera review, to enable
the trial court to address any challenge to the privilege log made
by the Plaintiff. 166
While the court of appeals disposed of the case on other grounds, it is
informative that the trial court in the case required the preparation of a privilege
log. 167 In fact, in so holding, the trial court was recognizing that all of the information
being withheld by the defendants was not necessarily subject to an exception. 168
In Sanchez v. New Mexico Dep’t of Public Safety, an officer-involvedshooting out of Ruidoso, the Plaintiff made a pre-filing request for records from the
agency who investigated the shooting, DPS. 169 DPS responded with a blanket denial
based on the law enforcement exception to IRPA, to which the Plaintiff wrote a
detailed letter challenging the withholding, and to which DPS did not reply. The
Plaintiff was then forced to file suit and it was not until Plaintiff filed her Motion for
Summary Judgment that DPS produced the entire file. 170 DPS argued that because it
could not determine which information may be important to a prosecution that DPS
could not release the information until the district attorney cleared the file, and that
because DPS did eventually produce the information, no damages could flow from
their actions. 171 DPS provided no documents or evidence to the court to prove that
any documents in the investigation file fell within the law enforcement exception,
only generalized argument. 172 The district court disagreed with DPS that it could

164. The plaintiffs sued both the Albuquerque Police Department and the New Mexico Department of
Public Safety. DPS had averred that disclosure of records in its possession would interfere with an
investigation of the shooting by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Jones, 2018 WL 3000216, at *1.
165. Id. at *3.
166. Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).
167. Id.; see also Hartman v. Texaco, Inc., 1997-NMCA-032, ¶ 20, 123 N.M. 220, 937 P.2d 979, cert.
denied, 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 1997) (party can meet burden to establish
immunity from disclosure of documents under work product doctrine by submitted “detailed affidavits
sufficient to show that precise facts exist to support the immunity claim”).
168. Jones, 2018 WL 3000216, at *5 (Vargas, J., dissenting) (“While the district court appears to have
concluded that the exemption set out in Section 14-2-1(A)(4)[, now 14-2-1(D),] was applicable to this
case, it simultaneously recognized that all of the information withheld by Defendant may not be subject
to the exemption” because it ordered a log produced if the files were not.).
169. Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for an Index and for Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchez ex rel.
Sanchez v. N.M., D-101-CV-2018-01510.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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make a blanket denial under IPRA, and during argument cited its own case that was
up on appeal at that time, Noll. 173
In March of 2019, the Court of Appeals decided Noll. 174 Noll involved an
IPRA enforcement action based on requests to inspect public records made by Erin
Noll, the widow of a man who was killed in an officer-involved shooting. One
defendant, the Town of Edgewood, refused to permit inspection of any records
because the Town claimed that the records were “part of an ongoing investigation.”
The other defendant, DPS, initially deemed Noll’s request to be “over[ly]
burdensome” then later informed Noll that it could not comply with her request “at
the present time” because it had not received approval from the district attorney to
release the information from its investigation. Noll filed an IPRA enforcement action
and was ultimately successful, receiving both the records she requested and costs and
attorney fees. DPS and the Town appealed, challenging both the district court’s
award of costs and fees and what DPS and the Town perceived to be the district
court’s effective imposition of a “requirement that they file suit and seek in camera
review before invoking the law enforcement exception.” In affirming the district
court’s decision, the court held that a public body fails “to satisfy t[its] statutory
responsibilities to process and fully respond” to an IPRA when it does not conduct a
meaningful review of the requested documents. 175 Further, the court expressly held
that “[n]othing in the plain language of IPRA authorizes a blanket denial of public
access to records, express or implied, solely because those records are the subject of
an ongoing investigation.” 176 As to the district court’s “requirement” of an in camera
review, the court found that though the specific testimony of the involved parties
resulted in the court’s conclusion that defendants should have sought in camera
review, “to the extent that the facts of a case may leave the public body questioning
the applicability of an exception, in camera review is an appropriate method to ensure
compliance.” 177
Noll offers two key takeaways. First, there exists no “ongoing
investigation” exemption in IPRA that justifies blanket denials of requests related to
officer-involved shootings. Second, Noll makes clear that it is the “initial
responsibility of the custodian—not the court—to determine what records are
responsive to the request and what public records are exempt from disclosure[.]” 178
Noll thus reinforces IPRA’s requirement that a public body must, in the first instance,
undertake a meaningful evaluation of the requested records; there is simply no other
way to determine what records are (1) responsive, and (2) exempt. Denying a request
without first engaging in the requisite evaluation violates both the spirit and the letter
of IPRA.
Jones made clear, through a different avenue, that a law enforcement
agency is not allowed to make a blanket withholding of documents, and that a
173. Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v.
N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, D-101-CV-2018-01510 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 2019).
174. Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar.
19, 2019).
175. Id. at *5.
176. Id. at *6.
177. Id. at *6.
178. Id.
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privilege log provides the plaintiff sufficient information to assess the reasoning of
the withholding and challenge any documents believed to be withheld improperly.
Noll tackled the IPRA issue head on and held, at the district court and court of appeals
levels, that the law enforcement exception does not support blanket denials—IPRA
requires all agencies to conduct a meaningful review of the requested documents.
However, this still allows agencies to withhold documents with little information
provided to the requester which in turn requires the requester to sue an agency and
records custodian to obtain an in camera review—all of which consumes the time of
the parties and the courts. A better solution, one that is consistent with IPRA’s intent,
is required that will disabuse law enforcement agencies in the first instance of their
notion that they may hide the ball from IPRA requesters.
IV.
THE CONDUCT OF NEW MEXICO LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES SUGGESTS THE NEED TO REQUIRE MORE DETAILED
DENIALS FROM AGENCIES.
There exists a clear issue of transparency in New Mexico regarding its law
enforcement agencies that challenges the foundation of IPRA, the trust of the public,
and the capacity of the courts. An effective and reasonable mechanism aimed at
improving and promoting transparency while simultaneously respecting the public
policy concerns that underlie IPRA’s law enforcement exception already exists under
federal law.
At the federal level, FOIA allows any person to request any record from any
federal agency or entity without having to provide a reason for the request. 179 There
are, as with all comprehensive statutory schemes, exceptions to the general rule of
access established by FOIA. 180 Federal courts interpreting FOIA have held that the
government defendant is required to produce an index containing a description of the
documents in its possession claimed to be exempt from inspection, along with an
explanation of the reasons for withholding production of those documents. Such a
requirement should be adopted in New Mexico—either by the Legislature through
the adoption of an explicit statutory provision, or by New Mexico’s appellate courts
through their ability to construe IPRA, specifically Section 14-2-11(B), in a way
consistent with and to effectuate the purpose of IPRA—as a way to battle law
enforcement agencies’, and any other public body’s, ongoing and repeated efforts to
hide the ball and to seek their compliance with the spirit, and letter, of IPRA. 181 Every
public body must already undertake document-by-document review of records and
make individualized determinations regarding whether information is exempt or

179. 5 U.S.C § 552(3) (2012).
180. FOIA contains nine specific exceptions to public access. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9). Only the
exception for information specifically exempted under other laws is mandatory; the others are
discretionary. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see also Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Archivist of the U.S., 909 F.2d
541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A) (2012)(FOIA does not apply to the President, the
President’s advisors or the legislature.), see 5 U.S.C. §552(3)(C); Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164
F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir 1998)(only a “reasonable” search for requested documents need be undertaken by
an agency and if done and no documents are found, that ends the agency’s responsibilities).
181. Cf. Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040, at *1–2, *5 (N.M.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2019) (testimony of the district attorney for Santa Fe in-line with that of the records
custodian for DPS’ arguments for withholding production).
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nonexempt. 182 Any public body who claims any information or documents may be
withheld under any exception under IPRA, and particularly under the law
enforcement records exception, should be required to provide, as part of the denial
process, an index, suitably detailed, informing the requester generally of the
information or material being withheld, and with a level of detail beyond mere
conclusory generalizations as to how the material meets the specific exception. The
requirement to document that undertaking—and then to provide that documentation
to the requester in lieu of the records themselves—is neither unreasonable nor
burdensome because an agency’s custodian is already implicitly required to
undertake that review under IPRA. The proposal to require agencies to provide an
index when denying inspection of records simply makes the requirement explicit and
formalizes its parameters.
A. Vaughn and the Idea of an Index – A Modest Proposal
Under FOIA, the federal courts utilize in camera review of contested
documents, but, because of the burden this puts on the court, the Vaughn court long
ago established an intermediate step—the creation of an index by the defendant—
that places the burden back on the government to encourage disclosure and increases
efficiency in the courts. 183
The Vaughn index came about when the government denied a FOIA request
and responded to the requester by stating that certain documents fell under three
exemptions which permitted it to refuse disclosure. 184 In contravention of
congressional intent and the statute, the government “claim[ed] all it need[ed] do
[was] to aver that the factual nature of the information is such that it falls under one
of the exemptions.” 185 The court rejected the government’s contention, reasoning
that “as a tactical matter, it is conceivable that an agency could gain an advantage by
claiming overbroad exemptions” 186 and once the request was denied in such a
manner,
the opposing party is comparatively helpless to controvert this
characterization. If justice is to be done and the Government’s
characterization adequately tested, the burden now falls on the
court system to make its own investigation. This is clearly not what
Congress had in mind. 187
In Vaughn, the information withheld was voluminous and based on multiple claimed
exemptions under FOIA; the court declined to commit resources and costs to
reviewing the withheld information, which, in terms of judicial manpower required

182. See, e.g., San Juan Agric. Water User Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, 150 N.M. 64, 257
P.3d 884; Britton v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, 433 P.3d 320; Noll v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, No. A-1-CA-35981, 2019 WL 1615040 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2019).
183. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 822–23 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 825–26.
186. Id. at 826; cf. ACLU v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, 392 P.3d 181.
187. 484 F.2d at 826.
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would have been immense. 188 In addition, in such situations where an entire
document was unlawfully withheld simply because a portion of it was arguably
exempt, a practice that the court expressly disapproved of, the court noted that it
would have to expend even more resources because “[i]solating what exemptions
apply to what parts of a document makes the burden of evaluating allegations of
exemption even more difficult.” 189 Such a burden, the court stated, was not justified
or permissible. Rather, “[t]he burden ha[d] been placed specifically by statute on the
Government.” 190
The Vaughn court also disapproved of the tactical advantage a government
agency might gain from placing the burden upon the court. “If the morass of material
is so great that court review becomes impossible, there is a possibility that an agency
could simply point to selected, clearly exempt portions, ignore disclosable sections,
and persuade the court that the entire mass is exempt.” 191 To avoid such ploys and
the resulting evasion of justice, the court implemented an indexing requirement that
governmental agencies must use in FOIA requests. Thereafter, when the government
withholds a document alleging exceptions under FOIA, it must provide to the
requesting party:
(1)
A detailed justification that contains “a relatively detailed
analysis in manageable segments” explaining the exemptions. 192
The justification must not be merely “conclusory and generalized
allegations of exemptions.” 193
(2)
A description of the documents withheld that satisfies the
need for “specificity, separation, and indexing,” by “specify[ing]
in detail which portions of the document are disclosable[,] and
which are allegedly exempt . . . achieved by formulating a system
of itemizing and indexing that would correlate statements made in
the Government’s refusal justification with the actual portions of
the document.” 194
(3)
enough detail to permit “adequate adversary testing,”
because given a “more adequate, or rather less conclusory,
justification in the Government’s legal claims, and more
specificity by separating and indexing the assertedly exempt
documents themselves, a more adequate adversary testing will be
produced.” 195
Such an index makes it more likely that “a party’s right to information is not
submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischaracterization, and . . .
permit[s] the court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of
disputed information.” 196 Such an index is also necessary because
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 826.
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the agency has full knowledge of the contents of the withheld
records and the requester has only the agency’s affidavits and
descriptions of the documents, its affidavits must be specific
enough to give the requester ‘a meaningful opportunity to contest’
the withholding of the documents and the court to determine
whether the exemption applies. [T]he agency must describe each
document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it
must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after
information. 197
The Vaughn court also reasoned that the preparation of an index would avoid the
court having to expend its precious judicial resources engaging in an in camera
review of the documents withheld by the agency, or at the very least, narrow its
expenditure of effort in reviewing withheld documents. 198
The Vaughn index has since been codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations and is identified therein as an
[i]temized index, correlating each withheld document (or portion)
with a specific FOIA exemption(s) and the relevant part of the
agency’s nondisclosure justification. The index may contain such
information as: date of document; originator; subject/title of
document; total number of pages reviewed; number of pages of
reasonably segregable information released; number of pages
denied; exemption(s) claimed; justification for withholding;
etc.” 199
While some state jurisdictions have adopted the requirement of the FOIA index, 200
others have no such requirement. 201
Indices similar to the Vaughn index, as well as the requirement for in
camera review, have been utilized by New Mexico courts in some cases. 202
Moreover, the production of an explanation by the withholding party to the
requesting party is not a novel concept under New Mexico law. While admittedly in
a different context, New Mexico courts have established the requirement a party who
refuses to produce documents in discovery in a civil action based on a claim of

197. ACLU of N. Cal. v. Superior Court, Cal. Rptr. 3d 472, 493–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (second
alternation in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
198. Id. at 824-25.
199. Vaughn Index, 32 C.F.R. § 701.39 (2019).
200. Cranford v. Montgomery Cty., 481 A.2d 221, 229, 231 (Md. 1984) (burden on records custodian
to fully review all records requests “to determine whether the document or any severable portion of the
document meets all of the elements of an exemption” and for anything withheld, “the agency involved
ordinarily should be able, without disclosing privileged information, to present a sufficiently detailed
description and explanation to enable the trial court to rule whether a given document, or portion thereof,
is exempt without the necessity of an in camera inspection.”).
201. Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 266 P.3d 623, 631 (Nev. 2011) (declining to adopt a prelitigation Vaughn index under its records act because the act already lays out a requirement that any denial
in whole or part requires “(1) Notice of that fact; and (2) A citation to the specific statute or other legal
authority that makes the public book or record, or a part thereof, confidential.”).
202. See Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep’t, No. A-1-CA-35120, 2018 WL 3000216, at *3
(N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2018), cert. granted S-1-SC-37094 (N.M. Sup. Ct. July 23, 2018).
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attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine to produce a privilege
log at the time of the refusal. 203
The likely response to and argument against this proposal by public bodies
is that there is no obligation for public bodies “to create a public record” under
IPRA. 204 It is true that IPRA does not require that an agency create a record in order
to have a document responsive to a records request. 205 However, IPRA does require
that a governmental agency presented with a properly formatted IPRA request
respond in writing to the requester in several circumstances. 206 This evinces the
Legislature’s acknowledgment and intent that agencies will, indeed, have to create
records in some instances in order to fully and ably fulfill their obligations under
IPRA. Such a record is a necessary product of the IPRA procedure, as would be an
index. An index should be a part of the agency’s statutory obligation to communicate,
in writing, with a requester regarding the requester’s right to inspect records and an
agency’s alleged assertion that it may limit that right under one of IPRA’s narrow,
enumerated exceptions. And like FOIA, which does not require an index but under
which it became the norm as a result of judge-made law, and was codified in the
CFRs, IPRA does not require an index. However, to carry out the Legislature’s intent
and purpose in enacting IPRA, and to combat the disconcerting rise of unabashed
blanket denials by law enforcement agencies, New Mexico courts should follow the
common sense approach long ago implemented in federal courts interpreting FOIA
and establish a Vaughn-like index requirement, at the least holding that the law
requires agencies to provide a denial letter detailed enough for any requestor to
understand why any information is being withheld and whether to challenge it.
V.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement records clearly fall under the IPRA definition of a public
record. Any request for them under IPRA must result in production of those records,
unless a public body undertakes its statutory duty to perform a meaningful review
and determines in good faith that records or portions thereof that it seeks to withhold
from inspection specifically meets the narrow law enforcement exception under
IPRA. Under a plain reading of the statute, there is no support for the myriad
arguments advanced by law enforcement agencies to justify their blanket denials of
203. See N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-026 committee cmt. to 2009 amends. (“It is desirable that a party comply
with the provisions of Rule 1-026(B)(7)(a) by producing a privilege log of any information being withheld
from discovery on the ground of privilege.”); Pina v. Espinoza, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 24–25, 130 N.M.
661, 29 P.3d 1062 (party withholding information bears responsibility of identifying each document
withheld, describing nature of information withheld, and explaining the basis for withholding it—a
general statement is not sufficient); Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032, ¶ 20, 123 N.M. 220, 937
P.2d 979 (rejecting argument that documents withheld under statute not subject to privilege log
requirements at time of withholding, not after challenged).
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-8(B) (2009).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., § 14-2-8(D) (“If the inspection is not permitted within three business days, the custodian
shall explain in writing when the records will be available for inspection.”); § 14-2-11(B) (1993) (“If a
written request has been denied, the custodian shall provide the requester with a written explanation of
the denial.”); § 14-2-10 (1993) (requires written notice to requester after receipt of excessively broad
request); § 14-2-11(C) (custodian subject to action for damages for failure to deliver written explanation
of request denial).
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the citizenry’s right to access those documents. First, IPRA has no conditional
language supporting an argument of withholding because a record might reveal
exempt information. Second, IPRA’s language makes it clear that records are to be
reviewed and sorted to differentiate between records that are responsive and nonresponsive and excepted or not excepted and that are to be disclosed or may be
withheld accordingly. Third, IPRA does not allow a public body to shift the duty to
comply with its requirements onto another public body that is not the target or
custodian of the records requested. And finally, Romero, a case about civil discovery
and not IPRA, does not allow blanket denials under IPRA. In other words, none of
DPS’s arguments comport with law enforcement’s obligations under IPRA.
The repeated, blanket denials of IPRA requests by New Mexico’s law
enforcement agencies are burdening requesters by requiring them to engage the
courts for relief. These IPRA suits are in turn burdening the courts, which have been
faced with conducting in camera reviews to resolve the issues. In the Noll and
Sanchez cases, no documents were properly withheld pursuant to the law
enforcement exception. 207
In the interest of justice, disclosure, and efficiency, it is time that DPS and
all New Mexico law enforcement agencies be required to uphold their statutory
obligations under IPRA to disclose requested information to which requesters are
entitled under the Act. As to any records an agency chooses to withhold, it should be
required to inform the requester, in writing as required by IPRA, of the reason or
reasons why it is withholding. Mere conclusory statements in this regard do not
suffice, and an index requirement should be established, either as a matter of
interpretation by the courts, or by the Legislature through an amendment to the IPRA.
Indeed, such an index would also aid law enforcement agencies, which have an
actual, founded belief that information must be withheld to maintain the integrity of
an investigation, as long as the records in question fall within one of the four
categories of information exempted from disclosure under IPRA. The agency’s
preparation of an index would surely bolster its argument to courts, and narrow both
the dispute between the parties and the expenditure of judicial resources required to
resolve the parties’ remaining disputes.

207. Noll, supra.

